Introduction
Since the end of the Second World War and the dawning of the Cold War, dramatic human-driven shifts in the functioning of the Earth system have occurred. A variety of measureable trends show how the structure and makeup of the system are now being altered to the extent that they no longer resemble anything seen in tens of thousands (and in some cases millions) of years. As a result of human action, we are observing remarkable developments including the precipitous warming of the oceans and surface temperatures, the atmospheric increases of nitrous oxide, the acidification of the oceans, land use loss to agriculture, and a massive decline in biodiversity. Together, these trends point to a new era in the history of the earth.
The dawning of the age of the human -the Anthropocene -has generated intense, sustained debate over the last decade. From disciplines as seemingly varied as climatology, geology, philosophy, and visual arts, scholars have taken up the task of thinking through the the new Anthropocene age. This has meant pursuing multiple pathways of measurement, critique, and reflection on the origins of the Anthropocene, its current character, and what types of futures it fortells. While the geological evidence remains under debate for officially declaring the existence of the Anthropocene, a remarkable volume of scholarship has recently emerged that accepts the general premise -that humans are geological agents -and tries to figure out how and why it matters. For as much as the Anthropocene teaches us about the science of the earth, it also reflects attention back to the human. At a fundamental level, it troubles the intellectual and psychological conceptions of who we are as humans and how we relate to the world around us.
1 Even in the study of deep time and geological shifts, we cannot escape ourselves.
What then can international relations (IR) contribute to our understanding of the Anthropocene? And conversely what does the Anthropocene mean for the study and practice of global politics? Such questions can not be adequately answered in one article, but it is possible to probe the implications for greater detail and encourage further study and reflection. This paper therefore offers a preliminary assessment of the Anthropocene from the perspective of IR. The central argument in this paper is two-fold: First, international relations has largely failed to engage the Anthropocene challenge. Second, given the wealth of information emerging that shows the scale and types of impacts that humans have on the world, this is no longer sustainable. That is, IR must reconsider some core understandingsparticularly the relationships between the normative categories of humanity, the international system of states based on sovereignty and non-interference, and the natural world. It must abandon its atomistic theories of the international and begin thinking much more deeply about ideas of human entanglements with the larger world within which we exist.
Such a move can be accomplished without abandoning IR's central foci, which we might faithfully limit to war, security, and the effects of anarchical international society on states. Each is significantly impacted by the cumulative effects of environmental change but also by the emergent awareness of Anthropocene entanglement. To borrow Morgenthau's phrase, "the struggle for power and peace" is not going to disappear once the International Commission on Stratigraphy returns its verdict on the Anthropocene. However, if IR remains wedded to Holocene thinking, defined most acutely as the separation of humans from the world, it would be a disaster, both reflexively and for the world. Therefore we must force it into an uncomfortable place and consider the enmeshing of natural and social processes.
Given the stakes of the Anthropocene, and the fact that global political and economic processes, enacted most intensely by Western powers, are now deeply implicated in the current and future state of the world, IR perspectives have much to add.
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The Anthropocene marks a signficant moment for the discipline. The old world -the Holocene -which has been so instrumental in creating and sustaining IR -is now gone.
Much like how the discipline was transformed in previous generations as a consequence of catastrophes and globally significant events such as the breakdown of balances of power in Europe, the onset of the nuclear revolution, or the ending of the Cold War, it is now possible to see the Anthropocene as a defining marker for the discipline. It may lack the sudden cognitive and physical rupture of those world-defining events, but the revolution-in-slowmotion that is the Anthropocene is no less substantial. 3 And it similarly calls for IR to correct its own denial in the face of ongoing (and future) ecological shifts, as well as its own failure to think beyond the narrow anthropocentric, state-led, economistic boundaries, which together works to solidify the world of a bygone age.
To take one example, ocean acidification, which has already increased by 26% from pre-industrial levels, is projected to increase to 170% from pre-industrial levels by 2100.
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Even a modest reduction in the pH balance of the surface oceans will lead to the the reduction in growth and development of a range of marine organisms (particularly in lower latitude regions of the world) leading to a redistribution of fisheries yields and, accordingly, a reduction in food security (and human security). It will also result in an estimated economic 2 Depending on their interests, scholars might begin examining the effects upon the theories and practices of security, or how institutional dynamics and change are affected by the Anthropocene, or the interplay between, complex system risks, ecological tipping points, technology, and global governance. These are only a few examples out of a great many that can be coceived. A good starting point would be to read Victor Galaz. Global Environmental Governance, Technology and Politics: The Anhropocene Gap. (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2014) 3 In geological terms the changes are swifter than any that have come before. loss of $1 trillion annually by the end of the century. 5 Some studies have concluded that due to ocean acidification and other related stressors (e.g. biodiversity loss, overfishing) all marine fish species could potentially be extinct by 2048. 6 No matter where the world lands in terms of these scenarios, there will significant political and ethical ramifications. To carry on under these extraordinary conditions as though the nature and character of global politics will not change along with the weather is a dangerous form of denialism and moral failure.
Accounting for the Anthropocene means much more than the individual or cumulative effects of environmental change. It reflects a new reality, where humans, non-humans, things, and materials co-exist in complex relations of life and non-life. It also reflects distinct forms of failure and denial: in particular the failure of states (particularly those of us in the 'West') to adequately respond to overwhelming scientific evidence that warns us to adjust our ideas and behaviour, and prepare for a future unlike the past. As well, given the monumantal stakes involved, the Anthropocene represents the potential failure of modern human societies to preserve and sustain itself and other forms of life. All this also reflects the failure of IR to think of a different world; not in a utopic sense of building a perfect political community, but of thinking through the realization that we exist in a world that is far more complex, interactive, and varied than IR has yet imagined. No longer can the discipline deny these interconnected risks, threats, and physical effects, or maintain an obsolete image of the world built upon clean divisions between humans, states, and global systems. Given its claim to examining the 'global,' international relations is no longer simply a sub-discipline of political science and economics, but also of the geophysical sciences. Crutzen and Stoermer, 17. such a degree that the biophysical conditions of the Holocene epoch (lasting roughly the last 11,000 years) are no longer valid descriptions of the modern world. It is not simply that humans are outpacing geology as the drivers of global earth changes; they are the geological record.
Human activities have injected new biophysical factors into the biosphere, modifying the physical parameters that determine the functioning of major earth systems. 9 . The result is not only "climate change," which attracts the majority of attention, but also other environmental transformations which similarly threaten the "safe operating spaces" of humanity.
10 As Steffen et al observe:
The atmospheric concentrations of the three greenhouse gases -carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and methane -are now well above the maximum observed at any time during the Holocene…There is no evidence of a significant decrease in stratospheric ozone anytime earlier in the Holocene. Nor is there any evidence that human impact on the marine biosphere, as measured by global tonnage of marine fish capture, has been anywhere near the late 20th-century level at any time earlier in the Holocene. The nitrogen cycle has been massively altered over the past century… Ocean carbonate chemistry is likely changing faster than at any other time in the last 300 million years and biodiversity loss may be approaching mass extinction rates. Lewis and Maslin settle on two main contenders for the Anthropocene start date. Both reflect global political processes. The first option is found in the impacts from "the Great Acceleration," which refers in geological terms to the unprecedented and major expansions in human populations, together with the creation of new, long-lasting materials from minerals to plastics to persistent organic pollutants and inorganic compounds. Lewis and Maslin, 174. 21 Lewis and Maslin, 177. environmental security. One can go back to the early years of IR - groomed to thinking about world politics in a certain way. The discrepancy reveals that IR has failed to grasp the complex environmental components that comprise global politics. With the creation (or perhaps "discovery") of the Anthropocene, we are at the precipice of something simultaneously very old, and something entirely new. We are at the edge of the old world (in IR).
The End of Nature
Beyond the discovery of the new human age, the Anthropocene compels us to acknowledge the end of the world-as-nature. That is, it tasks us with contemplating a post- Another component of nature is found in the original IR trope of the "state of nature," used to portray the world without humans, or conversely humans without the social world.
From Hobbes to Rousseau onwards to most "traditional" theories of international relations the world primarily exists as the either the backdrop to the human drama, or as an ideal of purity to which humans should strive to emulate. Whether one retains optimism or pessimism regarding the abilities of humans to negotiate peace and achieve security, the world itself is emptied of agency. It exists primarily to satisfy or thwart the endeavours of homo sapiens sapiens to construct moral and rational political orders. Therefore, for most IR scholarship, a drought, or a hurricane, an oceanic garbage patch, or a lithium mine pit, offer limited and unremarkable appeal. On occasion these may be sites of international political contestation, and thus worthy of comment, but there has been little desire to identify and incorporate these as more complex assemblages of social and ecological life -as representatives of Anthropocene politics.
However, the Anthropocene brings with it the end of the world by rupturing the primary binaries upon which international relations has largely depended. This means breaking down the categorical barriers between human and non-human (natural) realms and allowing for the messy forms of complexity and entanglement that comprise systems.
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Viewing the world through the prism of the whole Earth system is to observe the cumulative interactions, overlaps, and intersections between groups of elements. Environmental regimes cannot be understood without giving agency to the nonhuman actants that make up the biosphere. Global economic relations cannot be understood without reference to the independent agency of algorithms that act too quickly for human oversight or interference. The economy is not an external object, but a set of assumptions, processes, and practices. Security cannot be understood solely as a set of speech-acts, but also requires guns, tanks, drones, tear-gas, badges, and fences. In each of these areas, there are non-human actants that fundamentally alter the condition of human possibility, in ways that are unpredictable and irreducible to their constituent elements.
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In tandem with "materialist turn" has been the growing focus on "the posthuman" in IR. Encapsulated in recent work by Erika Cudworth and Stephen Hobden, a posthuman approach to IR, emphasizes that "humans" and "humanity" are socially and culturally constituted categories. 46 They argue that to speak of posthumanism does not mean we should reorient the hierarchy that places humans at the top of ethical consideration or that we need to expand beyond anthropocentrism, though these ideas are present. Rather, we need to see ourselves as ambiguous beings, existing in tandem and combined with, non-humans. It means identifying and advocating for 'hybrid' and 'cyborg' ontological forms where mixtures of human and non-human components exist. This requires us to view categories like nature, the 45 Salter, 2-3. 46 Erika Cudworth, and Stephen Hobden. Posthuman International Relations: Complexity, Ecologism, and Global Politics. London: Zed Books, 2011. individual, society, and the international, as "relational achievements, power-laden constructions emergent from 'assemblages' [of] interacting 'actants' -not all of whom are human or alive." 47 For Cudworth and Hobden, the three primary impacts of posthuman IR are: 1) a shifting of the agency-structure debate by including the agency of non-humans; 2) an incorporation of complexity theory into the structures of world politics, via a focus on nonlinearity, causality, and unpredictability (i.e. small actions may beget large outcomes), and; 3) a demonstration of the the embedded hierarchies of power both within human systems and particularly between human and non-human systems. 48 All this forces us to think of the world as not inert matter only moved through physical laws but as acting upon us. Bringing the non-human into IR means researching "non-human" entities such as animals 49 , microbes, 50 devices, 51 materials, 52 and terrain 53 factor into our ideas and practices of global politics. One way, as philosopher Jane Bennett explains, would be to consider the material and quasi-agentic role of micronutrients that produce health or disease, and how they can trigger global crises, or how the confluence of processes comprising storms and droughts, can impact international security. 54 As Cudworth and
Hobden explain, examining war through the prism of posthuman IR could lead to a greater focus on how the human soldier itself is an amalgamation of non-human "parts" including night vision goggles, amphetamines, drones etc. It also could emphasize the ways in which animals have been absorbed (e.g. the war horse) and vegetation strategically degraded, in the practice of war.
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As it often is, the recent materialist and posthuman turns have arisen because a small number of graduate students and lecturers drifted afield into disciplines other than traditional IR. 56 Believing that This will not necessarily widen the scope of IR into intellectual incoherence but it will create new opportunities for ethical responsiveness and new types of political engagement. 59 According to many earth scientists, the Anthropocene announces a period of extreme upheaval and existential risk for most living things on earth. A refrain now common is that the world is on the cusp of a great dying, a mass extinction event not seen in 56 million years. 60 Since the dawn of the industrial revolution, anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), predominantly from burning fossil fuels, have increased the concentration of CO 2 in the Earth's atmosphere by approximately 40%. Because of their ability to trap heat the future trajectory of CO 2 emissions indicates that by century's end the world will be warmer by 2-4 degrees Celsius, despite the global pledge at the 2015 COP 21 climate summit in Paris to limit warming to 1.5 degrees. According to the IPCC, this anthropogenic interference threatens the integrity and survivability of vulnerable systems, particularly arctic sea ice and coral-reef systems. It will also increase the number and severity of extreme weather events (e.g. heat waves, droughts, hurricanes), and cause extensive biodiversity loss with an associated loss of ecosystem goods and services. 61 Finally, with increased warming, some ecosystems are at risk of abrupt and irreversible changes. Traversing so-called (and often unknown) "tipping points" may lead to the loss of human life and cultural heritage, but it may also lead to catastrophic changes and disasters on a larger scale, leading to the ecosystem collapse and the failure to maintain life. These abrupt ecological changes will exert corresponding stresses on existing governance systems (and regional strategic assessments) that may not be equipped to rapidly adapt. 62 Current extinction rates "are 1,000 times higher than natural background rates of extinction and future rates are likely to be 10,000 times higher." 63 The last time extinction rates were this high was 66 million years ago, during the Cretaceous-Tertiary (K-T) mass extinction event. This event, likely caused by a combination of large meteor impact (Chicxulub) in the Yucatan, Deccan volcanism in India, and a resulting impact winter preventing photosynthesis, was Earth's fifth mass extinction. 64 75% of all species, including the dinosaurs, perished. 65 This time around, human activities are the main cause of the accelerated rates of species extinction. These changes include the conversion of ecosystems into agriculture or urban areas; changes in frequency, duration or magnitude of wildfires; and the introduction of foreign species into land and freshwater environments. Combined with the increased speed of climate change, up to 30% of all mammal, bird and amphibian species will be threatened with extinction this century. 66 Given the stakes involved and the unique spatial and temporal threats created in the Anthropocene, there is a need to assess how so-called "natural processes" will impact the fortunes of people and states under an anarchical system.
More profoundly though it needs to reconsider the logic of the traditional security problematique -ensuring the promise of safety and survival -in an age of extinction. It also demands that we deal with the prospect of failure for the human species and the experience of failure for non-human animals, plants, and ecosystems. This requires both dissolving the image of humans as unbounded and outside nature, while simultaneously acknowledging the diverse, entangled nature of humans with the multiple subjects also threatened with future catastrophe.
One way this might be possible is to revisit the discipline's recent past and update dominant discourses on existential threats for a new age. For a discipline that found its voice in the midst of the Cold War -when apocalyptic visions of nuclear war and its environmental effects were commonplace -IR may again need to look at the debates on the moral, political, and technological components of extinction and their impact on our ideas of security. The prospect of sudden nuclear annihilation and the onset of a nuclear winter were driving forces behind the growth of IR during the latter stages of the Cold War. instead learn to incorporate the plurality, diversity, and entanglement of the risks, emergencies, and extinctions. The Anthropocene offers a similarly catastrophic threat landscape as nuclear winters, and but offers a different vision of extinction -one that is "slow, dim, barely discerned and yet violently effective." 70 Thus, part of the failure within IR likely stems from the problematization of agency in the Anthropocene. 71 It forces us to not only consider the breakdown of the human-nature divide and how it effects our perception of the unified agent, but also to consider whether humans (let alone individual persons) are even capable of intervening, or -if we take seriously the notion of entanglement -intravening.
This reflects two central problems to responding politically to extinction in the Anthropocene: its complexity and its scale.
First, extinction itself is not a singular process. According to Claire Colebrook, the Anthropocene forces us to confront different types (or 'senses) of human extinction: the fact that humans will become extinct, the fact that humans cause other species extinctions, and finally the fact of self-extinction, where we are destroying that which makes us human. 72 The diffuse forms of extinction operate at varying, interconnected scales, impacting they ways in which they are felt, experienced, or predicted. Responding to extinction encompasses inherently complex, non-linear and unpredictable forms. And in the end, these responses and interventions are themselves never fully human. We are thus presented with the uneasy prospect of being unintentionally responsible for cascading extinction events that we cannot prevent, slow or stop.
A second, related, problem for IR reflects a more practical concern: mass extinctionvia its monumental and miniscule temporal and spatial scales -is foreign to human agency.
The timeframe of the Anthropocene is indeed nothing more than a blink in geologic time, but trying to construct a political response for a cumulative series of events over the course of a century, let a lone a millennia, is a tall task indeed. This difficulty is compounded by the uncertainty, unpredictability, and the inequality of climate change. The world is slowly, ponderously, inadequately, preparing for a world that will be 2°C warmer by the end of the century. But what if the world is 4°C warmer, as some studies now predict? 73 The shifting degree of magnitude is likely to lead to the tropics becoming uninhabitable; guarantees the melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets; the subsequent rising of the oceans by upwards of 70 metres; 74 diminishing crop yields, which threaten food production and human health; loss of biodiversity; the spread of vector-borne diseases; and water scarcity. Even if governments of the world are successful at limiting warming between 2-3°C, the long-term impacts will be severe. Over the next 2,000 years, 20% of the world's population would be forced to move from coasts that will be swallowed up by the sea. Cities including New York, Calcutta, Shanghai, and Rio de Janeiro would be submerged under water. 75 Responding to this would require a total rupture of global migration norms and policy. The Anthropocene seems to demand the impossible.
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For IR to respond to the mass extinction problematique it has to acknowledge both complexity and the unique spatial and temporal scales of the Anthropocene. relative to humans. One only sees pieces of a hyperobject at a given time. 80 Stratigraphers excluded, we cannot wake up and point to the Anthropocene.
But the Anthropocene is a problem of, and for, IR. It reflects the numerous failings of the contemporary interstate system and the ongoing denial of the deleterious effects of the carbon economy that emanate from it. IR has indeed contributed much -from examining the difficulties in building effective environmental regime complexes to the murky role of climate change in conflict. 81 However, the absence of IR in contributing to the debates on the Anthropocene itself point to something more complex and disquieting, namely the myopic tendency to view humans, nature, and security as divisible strata that encounter one another instrumentally. Such views reflect old-fashioned forms of modernism and materialism, ones that helped contribute to the crises at the heart of the human age. Overcoming this myopia will be a central task for IR in the years to come.
Given its history in describing the uneven global processes of modern politics, IR is seemingly well placed to engage the Anthropocene, which emerges directly from those processes. Further, IR's commitment to tragedy as the centrepiece of politics is reflected in the "apocalyptic tone" so prevalent in Anthropocene studies.
82 But yet, the Anthropocene also presents IR with a "worldly" problem. This paper has offered a preliminary view of the Anthropocene for IR. It has argued that entanglement and relationality are crucial components for understanding the new age and that the Anthropocene takes IR to the "end of the world" in three interlocking ways. First, it pushes IR to abandon its Holocene origins and confront radically new understandings of the world and the human role within it. It suggests that while mainstream studies of environmental politics offer distinct utility for understanding complex problems, much richer theoretical and empirical investigations on the Anthropocene are required. This means that IR will need to better engage with ongoing debates and discussions in other disciplines, particularly those outside of political science. Secondly, it argued that the Anthropocene ushers in the end of the "world-as-nature." Such a view, where nature exists as a stable canvas upon which the acts of great power politics is performed, has been fundamentally altered via the Anthropocene concept. New approaches to IR, including but not limited to, new materialism and posthuman IR, offer considerable hope that we might begin reconstructing core ontological, epistemological, and ethical concerns in the discipline. The final section highlighted the problem of extinction in the Anthropocene. It suggested that apocalypses, existential crises, and extinctions need to be (re)absorbed into IR analyses in order to cope with the scalar and temporal magnitude of the Anthropocene.
Some may question whether any of this is possible, or whether IR is the appropriate discipline for such debates. Perhaps it should only absorb certain components of the Anthropocene -the legacies of imperialism, the abiding structure of the world system as an inhibitor to climate action, the prospects of climate wars, etc -and leave the rest to others better equipped. This is all acknowledged. However, my aim at this stage has been to disrupt, unsettle, and push a discipline whose denial of the Anthropocene may render it an idiosyncratic vestige of an earlier, failed age.
